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Introduction
Many economic institutions rely on competition to provide e¤ort incentives. Contests where only a small subset of players is rewarded with a prize are a prominent example. The recent literature has argued that there are many natural examples where this prize should be regarded as endogenous, in‡uenced by the e¤orts of the players. Several authors have carefully analyzed the mixed-strategy equilibria of all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes (AEP) for symmetric and asymmetric contestants.
2 While this literature provides a very general and complete analysis of the equilibrium for any given all-pay auction with endogenous prizes, this paper complements previous work by addressing issues of implementation and optimality.
As an illustration, consider …rms engaging in patent races to obtain new products. When …rms exert high research e¤orts, this will usually not only increase the chances of obtaining the patent, but it will also help to improve the quality of the product and thereby the monopoly pro…ts obtained in the product market. Thus, the prize obtained by winning the patent is an increasing function of e¤orts. The shape of this function cannot be designed freely by a regulator. Technology determines the relation between e¤ort and quality; demand determines the relation between quality and pro…ts. Contests with similar features are pervasive. As we will detail in Section 6, they include beauty contests, where a client invites suppliers to submit project proposals and then procures the project from the supplier who submitted the best proposal, as well as promotion races where employees compete to climb up the career ladder within an organization. We will see that prize functions may be increasing or decreasing in these cases.
The …rst main question is: If we have little information on the details of a competitive environment (e.g., a patent race), except that it is generated by an AEP, what can we say about the possible e¤ort distributions that can result as mixed-strategy equilibria? In other words, what kind of behavior can be implemented by suitable AEP? Our results show that implementation of very general distributions is possible with symmetric players; in other words, the mere fact that a competitive environment corresponds to an AEP imposes hardly any restrictions on the e¤ort distributions. In spite of their simple and special structure, AEPs are thus very rich in terms of the behavior they can induce.
In some contexts, however, there are natural properties of prize functions that can be exploited to obtain stronger restrictions on the outcomes of AEPs. For instance, in the patent race where the prize function re ‡ects expected monopoly pro…ts and its shape depends on demand parameters, the prize function is usually increasing and often concave in e¤ort. With these additional restrictions, we show that only equilibrium distributions with decreasing density functions can arise.
The second main question addresses a central welfare issue in the context of e¤ort incentives. In many competitive situations, the e¤orts of losers are wasted from an ex-post point of view, that is, they only serve to induce the winner to exert higher e¤orts. Again, this is the case in patent races where only the winner can introduce the good. We therefore ask under which circumstances AEP induce high expected highest e¤ort without also generating excessive loser e¤orts. Speci…cally, we show that the ratio between expected highest e¤orts and expected average e¤orts becomes higher for AEP than for all-pay auctions with …xed prizes. Particularly high ratios can be obtained when there is an approximately linear relation between e¤ort and prize or when there are hurdles, that is, reservation values that are necessary to obtain a prize.
Finally, we study the above-mentioned applications. We show that, given the expected average e¤orts of …rms competing to introduce product innovations, patents lead to higher expected product quality than research prizes that compensate for e¤orts. For promotion contests, we show that a principal who gives a …xed prize for promotion is not necessarily better of if contestants also take into account that high e¤orts may have direct positive e¤ects on their utility.
In Section 2, we discuss the related literature. Section 3 introduces the framework. Section 4 deals with symmetric players, Section 5 with asymmetric players. In Section 6, we provide several applications. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
The literature on contests has been nicely surveyed by Konrad (2009) . We thus focus more speci…cally on AEPs. Kaplan et al. (2003) have treated a symmetric two-player innovation game with symmetric information, where …rms commit to the timing of an innovation. After a simple transformation of variables, the game is almost identical to the AEP with symmetric …rms that we consider. 5 Depending on the prize function, the authors obtain (i) equilibria with randomization on an interval containing zero e¤orts, (ii) equilibria with an atom at zero and randomization on an interval starting with a positive e¤ort, (iii) more general equilibria with non-connected support. The asymmetric case has been treated both by Kaplan et al. (2003) and by Siegel (2009 Siegel ( , 2010 under mutually exclusive assumptions. 6 In Kaplan et al., the support of the strong player's e¤ort distribution does not contain zero, whereas the support for the weak player contains an atom at zero. In Siegel (2009 Siegel ( , 2010 , the support of the e¤ort distribution is a compact interval containing the minimal e¤ort, even for the strong player. Also, expected prizes with two players are positive only for the strong player and zero for the weak player. 7 In some important dimensions, Siegel's analysis is more general than both our paper and Kaplan et al. (2003) . He considers more than two players and multiple prizes and he allows for investments that are 5 Essentially, one can de…ne the e¤ort as the inverse of the time needed for innovation. 6 Kaplan et al. deal only with the two-player case and assume that the prize becomes zero for zero e¤orts. Siegel assumes that prizes are positive for minimal e¤orts (and that net prizes are declining in e¤orts). 7 This result has been generalized in Siegel (2012) .
conditional on winning or losing. Also, he allows for very general types of prize and cost asymmetries.
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Contrary to the existing literature, our main concern is to analyze which CDFs can be implemented as MSE of AEPs and which prize functions induce high expected highest e¤orts. To this end, we allow for prize functions that are compatible with the assumptions of Siegel as well as Kaplan et al. Accordingly, we obtain both equilibria where small positive e¤orts are avoided by the strong player (as in Kaplan et al. 2003 ) and equilibria where they are played (as in Siegel 2009 Siegel , 2010 . 9 We also provide a recursive formula for MSE with arbitrarily many connected components in the symmetric case. Though this possibility arises in Kaplan et al. (2003) and Siegel (2012) , there is no analogous result there. A more broadly related literature allows for asymmetric information in AEP. Kaplan et al. (2002) derive comparative static results when the prize function di¤ers across player types, which are private information. In a similar setting, Cohen et al. (2008) consider the optimal prize function for a principal who cares about maximizing total e¤ort or expected highest e¤ort (net of expected prizes). Interestingly, the optimal prize function can be decreasing in e¤orts for suitable prize functions when there are many participants. We do not deal with asymmetric information, because we want to focus on which e¤ort distributions can be generated endogenously rather than as a re ‡ection of type distributions.
Moldovanu and Sela (2001) is a paper that does not deal with AEP, but deserves to be mentioned. It also analyzes the question of maximizing the expected highest e¤ort, but in a setting with …xed prizes and asymmetric information. Instead of asking how the shape of the prize function a¤ects expected highest e¤ort, the authors address the role of the number of prizes.
8 Chowdhury (2010) analyzes a modi…ed all-pay auction where prizes are …xed, but not guaranteed even for a player who has exerted e¤ort. If the probability that a prize is actually distributed is increasing in the e¤ort of the high-e¤ort player, the game is isomorphic to an AEP with endogenous prizes.
9 Several authors have also considered the case that prizes depend not only on the e¤ort of the winner, but also on the loser (Skaperdas 1992 , Chung 1996 , Baye et al. 2010 ); Sacco and Schmutzler (2008) provide an experimental analysis.
Set-Up and Terminology
We consider a game with complete information. Risk-neutral players i 2 I f1; 2; :::; ng simultaneously choose e¤orts x i from X i = R + at costs K i (x i ).
10 Let x i = (x 1 ; :::; x i 1 ; x i+1 ; :::; x n ). Player i wins a prize of size a(x i ) with probability p(x i ; x i ) = 1 if x i > max j6 =i x j and p(x i ; x i ) = 0 if x i < max j6 =i x j . If several players exert the same highest e¤ort, each of them wins with the same probability. The expected payo¤ of player i is
Except where otherwise mentioned, we maintain the following assumptions on the prize function a(x i ), a: and (ii) it is continuously di¤erentiable to the right on (0; 1).
(ii) a(x i ) is continuously di¤erentiable in an open neighborhood of r i , with a 0 (r i ) < k i for i = 1; :::; n.
We apply the notation a 0 (x i ) to denote the right derivative even where no left derivative exists. We call prize functions satisfying A2 and A3 admissible.
The left panel in Figure 1 depicts examples. A3(i) corresponds to the …nite reach assumption, which is required for existence of an MSE. 11 A3(ii) rules out degenerate cases where the prize function touches the cost function from below at r i (as in the right panel of Figure 1 ).
De…nition 1 An all-pay auction with endogenous prize (AEP) is a simultaneous game with players i 2 I f1; 2; :::; ng, action spaces X i = R + and payo¤s functions i (x i ; x i ) given by (1), where K i (x i ) satis…es A1 and a: R + ! R + satis…es A2 and A3.
Figure 1: Admissible and non-admissible prize functions
All our statements refer to AEPs. Contrary to the setting with …xed prizes, A1 is not a strong restriction with endogenous prizes.
12 An AEP with some arbitrary e¤ort measure x i and a corresponding monotone increasing (potentially non-linear) cost function can always be transformed into an equivalent all-pay auction satisfying A1. 13 In Section 4, we impose the additional restriction of symmetric cost functions.
As Siegel (2009 Siegel ( , 2010 , we use the following concepts for an AEP.
De…nition 2 (i) The reach of player i is r i as in A3(i).
12 Moldovanu and Sela (2001) analyze how the optimal number of prizes depends on the second derivatives of the e¤ort cost functions.
13 Consider the transformation
Then consider the all-pay auction with endogenous prize de…ned by a
, where …rms choose e¤orts x T i , the winner obtains a T and the cost function is K T i . This AEP has the same economic content, except for the renormalization of variables. Nevertheless, the transformation leads to important changes in the interpretation of results. For instance, if the principal cares about the expectation of the e¤ort x i in the all-pay auction with a quadratic cost function, his objective function will be the expected root of the e¤ort e x i after the transformation.
(ii) The threshold T of the game is r 2 . (iii) The power of player i is w i = max fa (T ) k i T; 0g.
The reach is higher for players with lower e¤ort costs; thus, it is decreasing in i. Actions above the threshold are dominated for i = 2; :::; n; unless dominated strategies are played by the opponent, the strongest player can secure himself the prize by choosing e¤orts just above the threshold. With (SYM), actions above the threshold are dominated for all players.
As pure strategies often do not exist in AEP, we focus on mixed strategies.
De…nition 3 (i) A mixed strategy of player i in an AEP is given by a cumulative distribution function (CDF)
14 (ii) A mixed strategy pro…le F consists of mixed strategies F 1 ; :::; F n on X 1 ; :::; X n : (iii) A mixed strategy pro…le F is a mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE) if each
The support S i of a mixed strategy F i is de…ned as the set fx i 2 X i jF i (x i + ") F i (x i ") > 08" > 0g. We write S = S i when S i is independent of i.
The following de…nition is central.
De…nition 4 An admissible prize function a(:) implements a pro…le F of CDFs if F is an MSE for the AEP given by a(:). When a(:) implements a symmetric F = (F; :::; F ), we also say that a(:) implements the CDF F .
Under symmetry, the following types of MSE are of particular interest.
De…nition 5 Suppose SYM holds. (i) A symmetric MSE with CDF F is an interval equilibrium without atoms if it admits a density f which is positive only on S = [0; T ].
(ii) A symmetric MSE with CDF F is called an interval equilibrium with 14 Equivalently, one can de…ne a mixed strategy by a probability measure P on X i ; the corresponding F is given by F = P [0; x i ]. When a mixed strategy is given by F , the corresponding P is induced by P x
atoms if it has support [0; T ], but has an atom. (iii) A symmetric MSE with CDF F is a hurdle equilibrium if S = f0g [ [H S ; T ] for some H S > 0, the hurdle.
The following de…nitions will play an important role.
Symmetric Case
The main result for symmetric players, Proposition 3, shows which CDFs can be implemented as symmetric interval equilibria. We also provide general implementation results for distributions without small positive e¤orts in the support (Propositions 5 and 6). Moreover, we investigate which prize functions implement MSE with high expected highest e¤orts. As a preparation, we characterize the MSE for symmetric prize functions under DEP in Proposition 1, and we also discuss uniqueness (Proposition 2). In Section 4.4, we show that additional MSE arise if DEP is relaxed.
Existence, Characterization and Uniqueness
We …rst focus on interval equilibria; more equilibria will be discussed in Section 4.4. We distinguish between three mutually exclusive cases, C1-C3.
(C1) (i) a(0) > 0 and (ii) DEP holds.
Siegel (2010) uses C1(i), and instead of C1(ii) he assumes declining net prizes a(x i ) x i , as for a 1 (x i ) in the left panel of Figure 1 . 15 For di¤erentiable 15 Similar assumptions are used in Siegel (2009). a(x i ), declining net prizes imply a 0 (x i ) < 1 and thus
for a(x i ) x i , so that DEP holds.
16 C1 also holds for strictly concave functions such as Figure 1 even if they do not satisfy declining net prizes. Some nonconcave functions such as a 3 (x i ) also satisfy C1. The following alternative condition allows for prizes that are zero when there is no e¤ort.
This obviously excludes declining net prizes, but it includes concave prize functions such as a 4 (x i ) in Figure 1 . Finally, we allow for prize functions with a(0) = 0 and …nite slope at zero.
We can now characterize the MSE.
Proposition 1 Suppose SYM and DEP hold.
(i) An MSE exists for which
(ii) If C1 and C2 hold, the equilibrium CDF is atomless; if C3 holds, there is an atom at 0 with mass
Intuitively, the indi¤erence condition for an MSE requires that players are exactly compensated for expected e¤orts. Thus, (2) must hold. The proof shows that the conditions of the proposition su¢ ce to make sure that (2) de…nes an MSE.
We rule out other symmetric MSE than those in Proposition 1 if DEP holds. Moreover, interval equilibria cannot exist if DEP does not hold. 16 This implication holds because with a 0 (x i ) < 1 the net prize a(x i ) x i has at most one …xed point and a(x i ) > x i if and only if x i lies to the left of this point. Thus
xi whenever a(x i ) > x i . 17 Speci…cally, the class a(x) = x with > 0 and < 1 satis…es C2. Note that x is not necessarily monotone increasing (only if 2 (0; 1)).
Proposition 2 Suppose SYM holds. (i) If DEP holds, the MSE described in Proposition 1 is unique.
(ii) If DEP does not hold, the AEP does not have an interval equilibrium.
Thus, an AEP has an interval equilibrium if and only if DEP holds.
Implementation Results
We now consider the converse problem. Suppose given a CDF F , does there exist an admissible prize function which implements this CDF? We provide a complete characterization of the CDFs that can be implemented as interval equilibria of a suitable AEP. From Propositions 1 and 2, any candidate prize function with MSE F and support [0; T ] must satisfy
Also by Propositions 1 and 2, a prize function satisfying (3) is admissible and yields the equilibrium CDF F if and only if A2, A3 and, in addition, C1 or C2 hold. This leads to the following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose a CDF F has a density f such that
(i) F can be implemented as interval equilibrium without atoms if and only if the following conditions both hold:
(ii) If (4) holds, but (5) does not, then F can be implemented as interval equilibrium with atom at zero.
The proof shows that (4) guarantees that a F is admissible. 18 (5) makes sure that a F satis…es C1 or C2. Hence, F = (F; :::; F ) really is an interval equilibrium without atoms in case (i) and with atoms in case (ii). Additional properties of a(x i ) require further restrictions on F :
Corollary 1 Under the conditions of Proposition 3, a(x i ) can be chosen to be strictly increasing if and only if
Proposition 3 is very powerful if n = 2.
Corollary 2 If n = 2, any CDF F with a …nite and strictly positive density on [0; C] for C > 0 can be implemented as interval equilibrium without atoms for an admissible prize function a(x i ). If f is di¤erentiable, this prize function is (i) strictly concave if and only if
(ii) strictly increasing if and only if
(iii) not strictly increasing and concave unless f 0 (x i ) < 0 8x i 2 R + .
Condition (ii) requires
to be smaller than for the uniform distribution, which is the MSE for the AEP with …xed prize.
Even when the density is not …nite, implementation is often possible for n = 2. For instance, in Section 4.3 we show that power distributions can be obtained as MSE for suitable prize functions.
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For n > 2, implementation by admissible prize functions is only possible if the density is unbounded.
Corollary 3 Let n > 2. A CDF F with density f cannot be implemented as an interval equilibrium if lim x i !0 f (x i ) < 1.
Optimality
How does the prize function a¤ect expected average and highest e¤orts? We compare prize equivalent AEP, that is, AEP resulting in the same expected prize payments in the MSE.
Expected Average E¤orts In any MSE of a symmetric AEP containing 0 in the support, players must receive expected prizes that exactly compensate their e¤ort costs. Thus, the following result is immediate from A1.
Proposition 4 If SYM holds, any two prize-equivalent AEPs yield the same expected e¤ort.
Expected Highest E¤orts As argued in the introduction, it is often desirable in applications to induce a high expected highest e¤ort (…rst-order statistic), while keeping average e¤orts low. For n = 2, this amounts to a high ratio
To understand how close 2 can be to this maximum, we focus on a rich class of examples. For parameters > 0 and < 1, we consider the prize functions
For = 0, (8) de…nes a …xed prize all-pay auction. The limit case = 1 is a linear prize function. More generally, corresponds to higher sensitivity of prizes to e¤orts: The ratio between the prize of a player that wins with e¤ort x H and the prize of a player that wins with e¤ort x L < x H is increasing in . As (8) satis…es A2-A3 and C2, it de…nes an AEP if K(x i ) = x i . Thus, by Propositions 1 and 2, the unique symmetric MSE is the power distribution
Standard calculations show that prize equivalence implies
where C is the expected cost (e¤ort); examples of such equivalence classes are depicted in Figure A1 . Solving for yields
Inserting (10) . The upward-sloping curve in the right panel in Figure 2 shows the equilibrium expected highest e¤ort 2:2 as a function of within a class of prize equivalent AEP: Thus, within the class of incentive systems that lead to power distributions, the resulting expected highest e¤ort approaches the theoretical maximum of twice the expected average e¤ort as ! 1. For completeness, the panel also contains the expected average e¤ort ? , which is independent of within each class of prize-equivalent AEP (consistent with Proposition 4). The left panel in Figure 2 displays expected highest and average e¤orts as decreasing functions of for = 1. The di¤erence to the right panel arises because, as increases, must increase to guarantee prize equivalence. A ceteris paribus increase in has negative e¤ects on e¤orts, but the concomitant increase in has positive e¤ects. Thus, we obtain:
Result: For n = 2, the maximum possible expected highest e¤ort level within the class a(x i ) = x i is approximated by choosing close to one, that is, by approximating a linear prize function.
Note that decreasing prize functions ( < 0) lead to lower expected highest e¤ort levels than increasing price functions ( 2 (0; 1)). This is worth pointing out, because Cohen et al. (2008) have shown that decreasing prize functions can play an e¤ort-enhancing role when there is uncertainty about player types (See Section 2). However, even in their case, this requires the number of players to be su¢ ciently large.
Beyond Interval Equilibria
DEP is a convenient property of prize functions, but it is not always plausible. For instance, in patent races, extremely low e¤orts will typically not generate a positive prize. Therefore, we now show that, when DEP is violated, more general equilibria may exist.
Equilibrium Characterization
We will construct non-degenerate intervals [
so that one of the following two cases arises:
where
The sequences are constructed so that the restriction of
to H k is monotone decreasing. We use the following mild non-linearity restriction.
Speci…cally, we use the following recursive de…nition. all k where the corresponding quantities are well-de…ned, let
and 9" > 0 such that
We impose the following very weak restriction on a (x i ).
has …nitely many local maxima on [0; T ].
Proposition 5 Suppose SYM, (C4) and (C5) hold (i) If there exists " > 0 such that
exists, a MSE exists for which S = f0g [ H K . There is an atom at 0 with size
The condition in (i) generalizes DEP: It does not require that
is decreasing globally, but nevertheless the highest values are attained near zero. In this case, the support still contains a non-degenerate interval including zero. When (ii) applies, low positive values (below H k > 0) are not attained.
We also have the following uniqueness result:
Proposition 6 Suppose SYM, (C4) and(C5) hold. There exist no other equilibria than those described in Proposition 5.
Implementation
We restrict implementation results to the particularly interesting case of hurdle equilibria, which have the potentially attractive property that small positive e¤orts are not played. As argued repeatedly, it may be useful to have prize functions that generate e¤ort distributions without small positive efforts. We …rst show that Proposition 5 implies a condition for existence of hurdle equilibria, which is, for instance, satis…ed by a 5 in Figure 1 :
there is an atom at 0 with mass
Corollary 4 leads to an implementation result for such distributions.
Proposition 7 Suppose SYM holds. Consider a strictly increasing CDF F with a density f such that
Then, there exists an AEP for which the unique MSE is the hurdle equilibrium described in Corollary 4 with hurdle H S .
The simplest way to construct the required prize function is by choosing 
Optimality
As argued above, it appears plausible that hurdle equilibria induce high expected highest e¤orts. To this end, we reconsider the class of power functions x i . We now …x at speci…c values and consider hurdles that we allow to vary. Speci…cally, we write H S = hT for the threshold T = 1 1 and h 2 (0; 1). Using an analogous procedure as in Section 4.3, we then consider parameter choices h 2 [0; 1), 2 [0; 1) that yield the same expected average e¤ort. It turns out that these level curves are upward sloping: If the overall level of prizes is reduced, a reduction of the hurdle parameter h is necessary to keep average e¤orts at the same level. Figure 4 depicts the ratio of expected highest to average e¤orts as a function of h when expected average e¤orts are …xed at one. Thus, a simultaneous increase in the prize and the hurdle that keeps expected average e¤orts …xed increases expected highest e¤orts. 
Asymmetric cost functions
We now consider asymmetric costs functions. For simplicity, we use a more restrictive version of A2 from now on.
Assumption A2' : a(x i ) is (i) continuous, and (ii) continuously di¤er-entiable on (0; 1).
We …rst deal with the characterization of the MSE and with implementation. As in Section 4.3, we then use a rich class of parameterized examples to show which prize functions yield high expected highest e¤orts.
Characterization of MSE
We con…ne ourselves to the two-player case. We suppose that k 1 k < 1 = k 2 . Pure-strategy equilibria may exist for large cost asymmetries.
Proposition 8
], the AEP has a pure-strategy equilibrium (x 1 ; x 2 ) with x 2 = 0.
In particular, a PSE exists if a(x i ) is strictly concave and a 0 (T ) > k.
From now on, we therefore assume that asymmetries are less pronounced, so that the following assumption holds together with A1, A2'and A3.
We give conditions under which we can characterize MSE. C1'replaces C1 with the condition from Siegel (2010) .
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(C1') a(0) > 0 and a(x i ) kx i is strictly decreasing.
The alternative condition C2 is replaced as follows:
(C2') a(x i ) is strictly concave.
Recall that C2 does not require concavity. However, contrary to C2, C2' does not restrict behavior of a (x i ) near zero.
De…nition 8 In the case of asymmetric cost functions, the e¤ ort hurdle, H A , is given by min fx i 0jka (
This generalizes De…nition 6, as w 1 = 0 for symmetric cost functions. 20 To repeat, however, the framework of Siegel is more general in other dimensions.
Proposition 9 (a) If C1'or C2'holds, an MSE (F 1 ; F 2 ) exists such that:
and
(ii) F 2 has support S 2 = f0g [ [H A ; T ] and
(b) H A = 0 if and only if
(c) Expected payo¤s are zero for player 2 and w 1 = (1 k) T for player 1.
Several points are worth emphasizing. First, as in the symmetric case, the maximum of the support is the threshold for both players. Second, however, for strictly concave objective functions (C2'), the support is not necessarily the entire interval [0; T ]. Instead, an asymmetric hurdle equilibrium can exist where players have the same minimal positive e¤ort level H A in the support. (15) shows that this happens if asymmetries are large (k is small and w 1 is large) and zero e¤orts are unattractive (a(0) small and a 0 (0) high). Moreover, the high-cost player must have an atom at zero, whereas the low-cost player has an atom at H A . Third, for the two-player case treated here, Proposition 9 goes beyond Theorem 1 of Siegel (2009) and Theorem 3 of Siegel (2010) . Siegel requires that C1'holds. The proof of Part (b) of Proposition 9 shows that, in this case, the support is [0; T ] for both players, which is in line with Siegel's results. We show that the conclusion of Siegel can hold even if C1' is violated, but C2'holds instead. We also identify conditions under which the support is not [0; T ]. Finally, part (c) of Proposition 9 holds much more generally, as Siegel (2012) has shown. Moreover, all equilibria must be of the form just described.
Proposition 10 Suppose that C1' or C2' holds. Any MSE must be of the form described in Proposition 9.
For C1', Proposition 10 is already shown by Siegel (2009 Siegel ( , 2010 . Our proof thus focuses on C2'.
Implementation
Next, we present implementation results. Suppose given H A > 0, C > H A and CDFs F 1 and F 2 with supports [H A ; C] and f0g [ [H A ; C], respectively. We ask under which conditions a prize function with MSE (F 1 ; F 2 ) exists. Propositions 9 and 10 imply that the equilibrium CDF F 2 must satisfy
Thus, once the CDF of the strong player is …xed, the CDF of the weak player is determined by (16). The only candidate prize function that can implement
. We start with implementation by a decreasing net prize function. By Proposition 9(b), this requires that the MSE has support [0; C] for both players.
Proposition 11 Suppose a CDF F 1 has density f 1 and fx 1 j f 1 (x 1 ) > 0g = [0; C] for C > 0. Let F 2 be given by (16). Then (F 1 ; F 2 ) can be implemented as the MSE of an AEP with a decreasing net prize function if and only if
(17) implies that the candidate net prize function is decreasing. Next, we ask which CDFs can result as MSE for strictly concave a(x i ).
Proposition 12 Suppose a CDF F 1 has di¤erentiable density f 1 and 9 C > H A 0 such that 
Compared to the symmetric case, several points are worth noting. We obtain analogous CDFs on [0; C] as for the symmetric case as candidates for the e¤ort distribution of the low-cost player. However, the lower end of the distribution is replaced by an atom. Moreover, the other player's CDF is completely determined by the choice of the …rst player's CDF.
Optimality
We analyze expected e¤orts for prize functions given by (8). We consider small asymmetry (k = 0:95) and large asymmetry (k = 0:85). Figure 5 describes the equilibrium CDF for k = 0:95 and = 1 and three di¤erent values of , (0, 0:5, 0:8). We shall refer to these cases as the …xed prize case, 
Equilibrium structure
In the …xed prize case, only the weak player has an atom at zero. As increases, atoms for both players emerge and the support becomes smaller. For k = 0:85 (not depicted), the supports are smaller than for k = 0:95 and the atoms are larger; the MSE thus approaches an asymmetric PSE (which arises when k 1 .) Figure A3 shows the density functions for both players. Figure A4 displays individual e¤orts as a function of , with …xed as 1. The expected e¤ort is higher for the strong player than for the weak player.
Comparative Statics
An increase in asymmetry (reduction in k) implies higher expected e¤ort for the strong player and lower expected e¤ort for the weak player. Near the …xed prize case ( = 0), the e¤ort di¤erences are small. Figure A5 displays expected average prizes, expected average e¤orts and expected highest efforts as a function of . Contrary to the symmetric case, the expected prizes and expected average e¤orts di¤er. Even though the weak player is exactly compensated for his e¤orts on expectation, the strong player's expected efforts di¤er from his expected prizes. His expected prizes and e¤orts are both above costs, and they are generally not identical. Figure A6 shows that the winning probability of the more e¢ cient player is far from 1, in particular, for weak asymmetries (k = 0:95).
Comparing e¤orts for prize-equivalent AEP
Figures A7 and A8 show that the expected e¤ort of player 1 (2) is increasing (decreasing) in for …xed expected prize. As in the symmetric case, the expected highest e¤ort is increasing in (Figure 6 ) within a class of prize equivalent AEP. In particular, the expected highest e¤ort is higher in the almost-linear case than in the …xed prize case. Figure 6 also shows that, contrary to the symmetric case, the expected average e¤ort is non-monotone in (with an interior minimum). As in the symmetric case, increasing increases k = 0:95 k = 0:85 Figure 6 : Expected highest e¤ort and expected average e¤ort for prizeequivalent APA, where the expected prize equals 1 the expected highest e¤ort. Contrary to the symmetric case, however, has ambiguous e¤ects on expected average e¤orts, because it increases the e¤ort of the strong player and reduces the e¤ort of the weak player.
Applications
This section shows how innovation races, promotion contests and beauty contests can be interpreted as AEP.
Incentives for product innovations
Consider the following set-up. Two symmetric …rms spend R&D costs x i to obtain a patent on a new product. The patent is awarded to the …rm with the higher x i ; x i is also positively related to product quality. Once one of the …rms (say, …rm 1) has obtained a patent, it is not possible without infringing on the patent to produce a substitute that prevents the successful …rm from obtaining monopoly power. 21 The R&D e¤ort is without value for the loser.
Market demand is D(p; x 1 ), which is decreasing in p and increasing in x 1 . Let p m (x 1 ) be the monopoly price corresponding to quality x 1 . For simplicity, marginal costs are constant and normalized to zero. We can model the patent race between the two …rms as an AEP with a(x 1 ) = p m (x 1 )D(p m (x 1 ); x 1 ), the monopoly pro…t of a …rm with quality x 1 .
It is natural to assume that pro…ts are increasing in quality. Moreover, in many cases, the pro…t function is concave in x 1 . For instance, consider a linear demand function D(p; x 1 ) = (x 1 ) =2 p, where 2 (0; 1). Then, the positive demand e¤ects of higher R&D costs decline su¢ ciently fast that the monopoly pro…ts
are concave under the parameter restriction. By Corollary 2, for parameters such that pro…ts are increasing and concave in x 1 , the resulting MSE has a decreasing density. Moreover, we can compare the expected quality in the market with a patent (which is the expected highest R&D e¤ort) with the one that would have obtained in a race where the successful player obtains a …xed prize ( = 0) which compensates him exactly for the expected average e¤ort. Applying the arguments of Section 4.3, the expected highest R&D e¤ort is higher in the patent race than in the race where the …xed prize is given. Thus patents induce a higher expected highest e¤ort for any given expected average e¤ort than …xed prizes.
Promotion contests
Consider a promotion contest where two employees exert e¤ort y i that is used to determine who is promoted to the higher level. The direct value of promotion is A > 0. Suppose that the e¤ort has additional bene…ts to the employee, because it is useful for his future career within the …rm. For instance, the employee's knowledge about the organization might improve as he exerts more e¤ort, making his life in the organization easier in the future. Suppose that these e¤ects are potentially relevant if the employee is promoted and if he is not, but that their size is di¤erent in the two cases, given by L(y i ) and W (y i ), respectively. Net payo¤s are therefore L(y i ) y i for the loser and A + W (y i ) y i for the winner.
Assume that 0 L 0 (y i ) < 1 and 0
is a strictly increasing function capturing the e¤ort cost net of bene…ts without promotion. Let (x i ) 1 (x i ). De…ning x i y i L(y i ), a loser who chooses x i earns a net prize of x i . A winner earns A + W (y i )
+ and A2 and A3 hold. A simple example where this is true is when there exist constants ,! 2 (0; 1) such that L(y i ) = y i and
and, for a(
. In particular, the prize function is decreasing if and only if ! < , that is, if and only if e¤ort has a stronger e¤ect on the bene…ts in the current job than in the higher job. Figure 7 shows the equilibrium distribution of y i in three di¤erent cases, in all of which A = 5. The straight line in the middle depicts the uniform distribution of y i when ! = 0:25 and = 0:25, so that the e¤ort e¤ects on L and W are the same and W ( (x i )) L ( (x i )) 0 (…xed prize case). The convex CDF corresponds to ! = 0 and = 0:5, so that exerting e¤ort has positive e¤ects only in the old job. The concave CDF corresponds to the case that ! = 0:5 and = 0, so that exerting e¤ort has positive e¤ects only after promotion. Though the principal pays A in each case, the expected e¤orts are highest in the latter case where the expected prize for the agents also consists of the expectation of W ( (x i )) L ( (x i )) > 0. Agents intrinsic concerns for their performance in the job can thus lead to higher or lower expected average e¤orts, depending on whether the e¤orts have stronger e¤ects with or without promotion. 
Beauty Contests
Suppose a downstream …rm (the client) wants to procure a task from one of two suppliers i 2 f1; 2g. These …rms simultaneously choose costly and observable e¤orts x i 2 R + to prepare this project. Suppose the expected value of the project for the principal is an increasing function V (x i ) of e¤ort and that the party who is awarded the contract receives a …xed and commonly known prize A > 0. 22 The client awards the task to the supplier who exerted the higher e¤ort. After that, the supplier carries out the task at a cost of 22 The analysis can be easily modi…ed to account for the case that parties who exerted higher e¤ort receive a higher payment.
C(x i ). This function can be decreasing or increasing. A decreasing function makes sense when high e¤ort results in good preparation of the project, which makes it simpler to carry out. An increasing function is plausible when convincing the principal requires coming up with a project that is costly to …nance ex post. In such a context, the logic of the previous subsection applies: When the interests of the client and the suppliers are aligned, that is, e¤orts reduce future costs of carrying out the project, the prize function is increasing in e¤ort, conversely when e¤orts make the project more costly to carry out in the future.
Conclusion
Many economic institutions have features of all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes. This paper has shown that very general distributions can be obtained as mixed-strategy equilibria of all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes, at least in symmetric settings. It also shows which incentive systems yield high expected highest e¤ort, while avoiding excessive e¤ort of losers. Compared to all-pay auctions with …xed prizes, all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes generally do better in this respect, in particular, when prize functions are approximately linear. When the prize functions have hurdles below which there is no positive prize, this leads to further improvements.
The companion work of Jönsson (2013) analyzes symmetric AEP experimentally. Though the behavior of subjects di¤ers substantially from the prediction of Proposition 1, prelimary results suggest that the comparative statics insights of Section 4.3 hold: Modifying an AEP in such a way that expected average e¤orts are …xed, but prizes become more sensitive to e¤orts yields higher expected e¤orts.
The paper can be extended in various directions. Richer objective functions of principals might be studied: Principals might be interested in other goals than maximizing expected average or highest e¤ort. For instance, they might care about the minimal e¤orts, or they might want to secure that all players choose e¤orts close to some target level. And even if they care about the expected highest e¤ort, they may be risk averse, which might lead to very di¤erent optimal incentive systems than those described above. Never-theless, the techniques developed in this paper would appear to be a useful step in deriving the appropriate systems for such alternative targets: The implementation results at least show what kind of behavior can be induced with suitable AEP.
APPENDIX
9.1 Appendix 1: Proofs 9.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We appeal to the standard characterization result for MSE with continuous action spaces (adapted from Osborne 2004, Proposition 142.2).
Lemma 1 F is a MSE if and only if (i) there is no action which, given the opponents'behavior, yields higher expected payo¤ than F and (ii) F assigns zero probability to the set of actions for which, given the opponents'behavior, the expected payo¤ is less than her expected equilibrium payo¤.
We now prove Proposition 1. DEP implies that F (x i ) as in (2) is strictly increasing on
and F is a CDF without atoms, with support
and an atom at zero with mass lim x i !0 F (x i ). (2) implies that expected payo¤s are zero on [0; T ]. Because a(x i ) < x i for all x i > T; F corresponds to a MSE by Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
We …rst prove several lemmas.
Lemma 2 If SYM holds, any symmetric MSE must satisfy (i) or (ii): (i) It has no atoms, and M min S = 0.
(ii) It has an atom at 0 with mass denoted as F (0). Case (ii) requires that a(0) = 0 and q n a 0 (0) 1 where q n = (F (0)) n :
Proof. The proof has three steps:
Step 1: M min S = 0 for every symmetric MSE without atoms.
Step 2: A symmetric MSE with an atom at e x > 0 does not exist.
Step 3: A symmetric MSE with an atom at 0 requires a(0) > 0 or q n a 0 (0) >
1.
Step 1: Suppose M > 0. For any sequence x n ! M , the probability of winning approaches zero. By continuity, lim xn!M a(x n ) = a(M ) < 1. The expected net payo¤ thus falls below zero as x n ! M , so that M = 2 S.
Step 2: Suppose e x > 0 is an atom. This requires a(e x) e x. In the proposed MSE, for each player and each m 2 f1; :::; ng, there is a probability q m > 0 that he is among the m players with the highest e¤ort. The expected net gain for a player from shifting the atom to the right by " is approximately P n m=2 q m m 1 m a(e x) + P n m=1 "q m a 0 (e x) ", which is positive if a (e x) > 0 and " is su¢ ciently small. Thus, shifting the atom to the right by some su¢ ciently small " increases expected payo¤s, a contradiction.
Step 3: Suppose there is an atom at 0. Then in the proposed MSE, all players tie with some probability q n > 0. The expected net gain from shifting the atom to the right by " is approximately q n n 1 n a(0) + "q n a 0 (0) ", which is positive for su¢ ciently small " if a(0) > 0 or q n a 0 (0) > 1. Thus, unless a(0) = 0 and q n a 0 (0) 1, shifting the atom to the right by some su¢ ciently small " increases expected payo¤s, a contradiction.
Proof. By Lemma 2, for every symmetric MSE and all " > 0, there exist x i < " such that x i is played. Also, there is no atom at 0 unless a(0) = 0. Thus, expected payo¤s approach zero as x i does. By Lemma 1 (i), there exists no x i 2 X i for which F (x i ) n 1 a(x i ) x i > 0. Moreover, as 0 2 S, F assigns zero probability to the set of x i for which F (x i ) n 1 a(x i ) x i < 0 by Lemma 1(ii). Right continuity of F and a thus imply F (
Lemma 5 If SYM and DEP hold, there can be no
Proof. There are no atoms at x H by Lemma 2.
Lemma 6 a (x i ) x i . This is positive if
, which is true for L > x i > H S , a contradiction. Thus, L = H S .
We now prove Proposition 2. 
is …nite, that is, (4) holds. In this case, a F is also right di¤erentiable at 0.
Further, a F can always be extended to the right in a continuously di¤eren-tiable way such that a F (x i ) < x i on [C; 1) and therefore A3(i) holds. A3(ii) holds because a F 0 (C) < 1 for f (C) > 0. It remains to be shown that a F satis…es C1 or C2 if and only if (5) holds. First, consider C1(ii) and C2(iii), that is, DEP. This requires
(19) follows from f (x i ) > 0: (5) is equivalent with the requirement that
with C1(i) or C2(i) and C2(ii).
(ii) The preceding analysis shows that C3 holds in this case.
Proof of Corollary 1
For a
is increasing on [0; C].
Proof of Corollary 2
Implementability follows immediately from Proposition 3: For n = 2, (4) holds if f (x i ) > 0 and (5) holds if f (x i ) is bounded. Part (i) and (ii) of the Corollary are straightforward. (iii) is implied by (i) and (ii).
9.1.6 Proof of Corollary 3 a F (x i ) as in (3) violates (4) if lim x i !0 f (x i ) < 1.
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) By (C4) and (C5), the sequences H k and J k are well-de…ned and stop after …nitely many iterations. F de…nes a distribution: It is increasing on each
(ii): analogous.
Proof of Proposition 6
By Lemma 3, [F (
Clearly, for every e x i 2 H k+1 ; J k and all " > 0 
. If the conditions of Proposition 5(i) hold, H K = 0 and
Hence, there is an atom at 0 or H k . The latter possibility violates Lemma 2.
Proof of Corollary 4
The assumptions imply that K = 1 and H 1 = 0. Thus, Proposition 5 gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 7
Let a
on (0; T ], and it is interior. Corollary 4 yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 8
Let x 1 = arg max x 1 2[0;r 1 ] a(x 1 ) kx 1 , x 2 = 0. By construction, x 1 is a best response for player 1. Because x 1 > r 2 , player 2 will not deviate to x 2 x 1 . Deviation to x 2 2 (0; x 1 ) yields negative payo¤s.
Proof of Proposition 9
We …rst prove a series of lemmas.
Lemma 8 
Lemma 9
Deviations of player i = 1; 2 to x i = 2 S i are non-pro…table if
Proof. By de…nition of T , deviations of player 2 to x 2 > T are nonpro…table. As C1' and C2' each imply a 0 (x 1 ) < k for x 1 > T , player 1 does not bene…t from deviating to x 1 > T . Thus deviations to x i = 2 S i are unpro…table if H A = 0 and, in particular, under C1'. If C2'holds and H A > 0, player 2 cannot deviate pro…tably to x 2 2 (0; H A ), as this would involve positive e¤orts without ever obtaining the prize. Player 1 cannot pro…tably deviate to x 1 2 (0;
Lemma 10 F 1 is a CDF. F 2 is a CDF if and only if
Proof. By de…nition of T , F 1 (T ) = 1. By C1'or C2', F 1 (x 1 ) is increasing on [0; T ]. Thus, (13) de…nes a CDF; it has an atom at H A with mass
. For F 2 to be a CDF, it has to be increasing, which requires
C1' implies (22) because a 0 (x 2 ) < k and w 1 = a(T ) T < a(x 2 ) x 2 . If C2'holds, the left-hand side of (22) Lemma 12 If C2'holds and
H A 2 (0; T ) is the only e¤ort level that satis…es both (20) and (21). (20) and (21) hold if and only if
(25) holds for x 1 = H A as H A > 0. C2'implies that the left hand side of (25) is increasing, so that the solution is unique. We now derive Proposition 9. If C1'holds, a(0) > a(T ) kT = w 1 and k > a 0 (0). Thus (23) holds. Hence, by Lemma 11, (20) and (21) hold for H A = 0. Thus, Lemmas 9 and 10 imply that Part (a) of Proposition 9 holds. If C2'holds, Lemma 12 implies that H A > 0 satis…es (20) and (21); thus F 1 and F 2 are distributions by Lemma 10, and they correspond to an MSE by Lemma 9; so that Part (a) of the Proposition also holds in this case. Part (b) follows from the De…nition of H A . Part (c) follows from Lemma 8.
Proof of Proposition 10
As the result for C1' has been shown by Siegel (2009 Siegel ( , 2010 , we con…ne ourselves to C2'. The proof follows from Lemmas 13-22. With few exceptions, these results are so general that they do not require C2'(or C1').
Lemma 13 S i [0; T ] for any MSE and i = 1; 2.
Proof. x 2 > T is not a best response for player 2 because a (x 2 ) < x 2 . Thus S 2 [0; T ]. If player 1 chooses x 1 > T , his net payo¤ is thus a(x 1 ) kx 1 . As a 0 (x i ) < k for all x i T , there exists an e x 1 in (T; x 1 ) such that the net payo¤ is a(e x 1 ) ke x 1 > a(x 1 ) kx 1 . Thus x 1 > T is not a best response.
Lemma 14
If player i has an atom in x , then for j 6 = i, there exists an " > 0 such that there are no best responses in [x "; x ].
Proof. Suppose player i has an atom in x with mass p(x ). Suppose for all " > 0 there exists a best response x j x such that jx j x j < ". By deviating to x j + ", player j would increase his expected prize by at least approximately p(x )
; his costs would increase by ". As " ! 0, the increase in the expected prize is higher than the increase in expected costs, so that x j is not a best response.
Lemma 15 In any MSE, 0 2 S 2 and the expected net payo¤ of player 2 is zero, that is, F 1 (x 2 ) a (x 2 ) = x 2 for all best responses x 2 .
Proof. Player 2 obtains a payo¤ of at least zero by choosing 0. Thus, F 1 (x 2 ) a (x 2 ) x 2 for any best response and, by continuity, for any x 2 2 S 2 . To show that Player 2 does not obtain an expected payo¤ above zero, it su¢ ces to show that there exists a best response x 2 for which he wins with probability arbitrarily close to zero. Let x inf S 1 [ S 2 . First, suppose no player has an atom at x. By de…nition of x one can …nd a sequence x n converging to x such that x n is a best response for at least one player i. As there is no atom at x, the probability of winning and thus the expected payo¤ converges to zero as x n ! x. By Lemma 13, player 1 obtains a payo¤ of approximately w 1 by choosing x 1 just above T . Thus, x n cannot consist of best responses for player 1. Hence, the x n are best responses of player 2 who therefore obtains a payo¤ of zero in the MSE. Second, suppose exactly one player has an atom at x. Then this player obtains zero payo¤s at x; and it must therefore be player 2. Third, by Lemma 14, it is impossible that both players have atoms at x. Finally, x = 0 and thus x 2 S 2 : Because player 2 wins with probability zero, his net payo¤s would be negative if x > 0.
Lemma 16 max S i = T for i = 1; 2.
Proof. By Lemma 13, it su¢ ces to show that max S i T . If max S 1 < T , then by A3(ii), given the equilibrium strategy of player 1, player 2 could obtain positive payo¤s by choosing x 2 2 (max S 1 ; T ), contradicting Lemma 15. If max S 2 < T , a 0 (T ) k < 0 implies that player 1 could pro…tably deviate downwards from T . Therefore max S 2 = T .
Lemma 17 If DEP holds, there can be no atom of player 2 at any x > 0.
Proof. If player 2 has an atom at x > 0, then by Lemma 14 there exists an " > 0 such that there are no best responses of player 1 in (x "; x ] = ?. Thus, by choosing x 2 2 (x "; x ), player 2 would obtain pro…ts of F 1 (x )a(x 2 ) x 2 . By Lemma 15, these pro…ts are 
Lemma 18
The expected payo¤ of player 1 is w 1 in any MSE.
Proof. By Lemma 16, given the equilibrium strategy of player 2, player 1 can guarantee himself a payo¤ of arbitrarily close to w 1 > 0 with certainty by choosing an e¤ort level just above T . By Lemma 17, player 2 cannot have an atom at T . Therefore, player 1 must obtain an expected payo¤ of exactly w 1 at T .
Lemma 19
Let H 1 min S 1 .Then (0; H 1 ) \ S 2 = ?.
Proof. Player 2's expected payo¤s for x 2 2 (0; H 1 ) are negative.
Lemma 20 (i) If C2'holds, then @ x; x 2 S 1 with x < x such that (x; x) \ S 2 = ?.
(ii) If C2'holds, then @ x; x 2 S 2 \(0; 1) with x < x such that (x; x)\S 1 = ?.
Proof. (i) Suppose 9 x; x 2 S 1 with x < x such that (x; x) \ S 2 = ?. If so, then, by choosing x 1 2 (x; x), player 1 would obtain pro…ts of F 2 (x)a(x 1 ) x 1 and thus, using Lemma 17, F 2 (x)a(x 1 ) x 1 . x 2 S 1 thus requires F 2 (x)a 0 (x) = F 2 (x)a 0 (x) 1. x 2 S 1 requires F 2 (x)a 0 (x) 1. These two conditions together violate C2'.
(ii) Suppose 9 x; x 2 S 2 \ (0; 1) with x < x such that (x; x) \ S 1 = ?. Then x = 2 S 1 is impossible. To see this, note that Player 2 has no atoms at any x 2 > 0 by Lemma 17. Thus lim "!0 F 2 (x ") = F 2 (x) and 8" > 09 2 (0; ") such that F 2 (x ) F 2 (x ") > 0. If x = 2 S 1 , " can be chosen so that F 1 (x 2 ) a (x 2 ) = F 1 (x ") a (x 2 ) on [x "; x ]. Thus F 1 (x ") a 0 (x 2 ) 1 on this interval, violating C2'. By analogous arguments, x = 2 S 1 is impossible. Thus, x; x 2 S 1 and (i) shows that (x; x) \ S 2 6 = ?. As player 2 has no atom, this would require that there exists an open subinterval of (x; x) in S 2 . Because (x; x) \ S 1 = ?, this would imply that F 1 (x)a(x 2 ) x 2 is constant on (x; x), which is incompatible with C2'. Proof. Let H 2 = min (S 2 \ (0; 1)). By Lemma 19, H 1 H 2 . We show that H 1 < H 2 is impossible. First, suppose there exists x 1 2 (H 1 ; H 2 ) \ S 1 . This implies F 2 (0)a(H 1 ) H 1 = F 2 (0)a(x 1 ) x 1 , violating C2'. Second, suppose (H 1 ; H 2 ) \ S 1 = ?. Thus, H 1 must be an atom of player 1. As H 2 is not an atom of player 2 by Lemma 17, F 2 (H 1 ) = F 2 (H 2 ) = F 2 (0) and H 2 2 S 1 . Thus, F 2 (0)a 0 (H 1 ) 1 and F 2 (0)a 0 (H 2 ) 1. These conditions together violate C2'. Thus H 1 = H 2 . Therefore, if H 1 = 0, then H 2 = 0 and, by Lemma 16 , f0; T g S i (i = 1; 2). Suppose S i [0; T ]. Then there exist x > x > 0 such that (x; x) \ S i = ?. Hence, by Lemma 20, x = 2 S j or x = 2 S j (j 6 = i). Thus, there exists a subinterval of (x; x) which has empty intersection with S 1 and S 2 . Choose the interval such that x is minimal and x is maximal. Then by Lemma 17, there can be no atom of player 2 in x or x. Thus either there is an atom of player 1 at these e¤ort levels or S 2 must contain intervals of the form (x "; x) or (x; x + ") > 0. Because of C2', the latter possibility can only arise if x 2 S 1 (x 2 S 1 ). In any event, x 2 S 1 , x 2 S 1 and (x; x) \ S 2 = ?, which is inconsistent with C2' by Lemma 20. If 
Lemma 21

Proof of Proposition 11
We …rst show that (17) is su¢ cient for implementation by monotone net prize functions. By Proposition 9, this requires that a(x 1 ) satis…es A2 and A3 and C1'. As to A2, the candidate function a(x 1 ) =
is continuously di¤erentiable for x 1 > 0. Continuity at 0 requires lim x 1 !0 a(x 1 ) = 1 f 1 (0) < 1, which is equivalent with f 1 (0) > 0. A3 is clearly satis…ed. C1'is equivalent with (17). Necessity follows because A2 is violated if (17) does not hold.
Proof of Proposition 12
We show that (18) is su¢ cient for implementation by a strictly concave price function. By Proposition 9, this is true if the candidate prize function satis…es A2 and A3 and C2'. A2 follows as in the proof of Proposition 11. A3 is clearly satis…ed. C2'is equivalent with (18). 
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